My research investigates moral agency in non-ideal conditions. While traditional moral philosophy often assumes rational, well-functioning agents, I examine how moral agency operates when our cognitive and emotional capacities are compromised, conflicted, or failing. My project unites work in moral psychology, philosophy of cognitive science, and bioethics to develop a comprehensive account of how humans navigate moral life given our psychological limitations. 

[title redacted]  - R&R - This paper argues that none of our extant theories of blame fully captures the social and moral function of what blame actually does. Blame is thus multifunctional, and a normative psychological perspective can unify blame's disparate functions. 

[title redacted]  - under review - This paper argues that there is a morally significant difference between accepting an apology, and forgiving a wrongdoer. Further, this paper puts forward that both acts are supererogatory in nature; positing a theory of graded supererogation. 

[title redacted]  - This paper argues that gaslighting recruits victims into a state of “baited” or “imposed” self-deception. Beyond constituting epistemic injustice, gaslighting undermines autonomy by conscripting victims into motivationally biased reasoning, thereby inflicting an additional moral harm.

[title redacted] - This paper argues that the therapeutic use of LLMs poses distinctive risks for individuals with delusional disorders. Because LLMs are designed to affirm and maintain conversational harmony, they reinforce rather than challenge delusional beliefs. Repeated algorithmic assent constitutes a morally significant threat to epistemic agency, autonomy, and is especially salient in vulnerable populations.

The Implications of Motivational Barriers to Care in Mental Health Contexts - AJOB Neuroscience - This commentary elaborates on the connection between motivational barriers to care, their possible remedies, and particular mental health conditions. (Access here).